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Abstract—Opacity, an information-flow property related to 
the privacy and security of a system, has been extensively studied 
in the context of discrete event systems. Although various notions 
of opacity have been proposed, in all cases the considered secret 
was constant. This work focuses on current-state opacity, 
considering a scenario where the secret changes dynamically with 
the system evolution. In other words, we propose the new notion 
of generalized current-state opacity (GCSO), which is with 
respect to a dynamic-secret model rather than a constant secret. 
Moreover, we provide a method to verify GCSO based on the 
construction of the GCSO-verifier. Finally, a practical example is 
given to illustrate the proposed notion and the method for its 
verification. 
Keywords—Discrete event systems; Opacity; Finite-State 
Automata 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This work investigates an information-flow property called 
opacity, which is related to the privacy and security of a system. 
In simple words, a system is said to be opaque if its secret can 
never be revealed to an external observer (i.e., intruder) who 
typically has the full knowledge of the system model but 
limited observability on the system behavior. Opacity is 
initially proposed in computer science for the analysis of 
cryptographic protocols [4] and later extended to discrete event 
systems (DESs) in the framework of Petri nets [2], labeled 
transition systems [1], and finite-state automata [5]. Since then, 
considerable attention has been drawn on opacity in the DES 
community. By considering different security requirements and 
different real scenarios, a variety of notions of opacity have 
been proposed such as current-state opacity, initial-state 
opacity, K-step opacity and infinite-step opacity. Focusing on a 
specific notion of opacity, the verification and enforcement of 
opacity are two problems investigated in most existing works 
[3]. 
To our best knowledge, although there are a variety of 
notions of opacity in the literature, all of them consider a 
constant secret. However, in some practical scenarios, it could 
happen that the secret of a system changes with the system 
evolution. For example, in a system modelling the routine 
activities of a person, his/her opponent may be interested in 
detecting different secrets of the person before and after 
observing a particular activity of him/her. Also, some critical 
information of a system might change due to the occurrence of 
a particular event that is even unobservable to its intruder. 
Consequently, we are motivated to generalize the notion of 
opacity so that the new notion may characterize the 
privacy/security of a system in the case that the secret 
dynamically changes with the system evolution.  
In this manuscript, we focus on current-state opacity and 
consider systems modelled by finite-state automata. First, we 
define a dynamic-secret model that describes the changing of 
the secret with the system evolution. Then, we propose a new 
notion called generalized current-state opacity (GCSO) that 
corresponds to opacity with respect to a dynamic-secret model 
rather than a constant secret. A system is generalized current-
state opaque (GCSO) if a malicious intruder that observes the 
system evolution, can never know with certainty that the 
current state of the system is in the current secret. In addition, 
we construct a so-called GCSO-verifier, based on which we 
may verify if a system is GCSO. Finally, a case study is 
provided regarding a moving vehicle that performs some 
loading and unloading operations, assuming that the intruder is 
interested in detecting different secret positions of the vehicle 
depending on whether or not the vehicle has been loaded.  
II. PRELIMINARIES 
Let Σ be an alphabet and Σ* be the set of all finite-length 
strings of elements in Σ including the empty string ϵ. Given a 
string σ∈Σ*, we use |σ | to denote the length of σ (|ϵ|=0).  
In this paper, discrete event systems (DES) are modeled as 
deterministic finite-state automata (DFA). A DFA is a 
quadruple 
G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), 
where X is the finite set of states, Σ is the set of events, δ: 
X×Σ→X is the deterministic transition function, and x0∈X is 
the unique initial state. The transition function δ is also 
extended to the domain X×Σ* recursively, namely, ∀x∈X, δ(x, 
ϵ)=x and δ(x, uv)= δ(δ(x, u), v), ∀u∈Σ*, v∈Σ. The set 
L(G)={σ∈Σ*| δ(x0, σ)!} is the language generated by G, 
where “!” means “is defined”.  
The event set Σ of G is partitioned into two disjoint sets, Σo 
the set of observable events and Σu the set of unobservable 
events, i.e., Σ=Σo∪Σu and Σo∩Σu=∅. The natural projection is 
P: Σ*→Σo* such that P(ϵ)= ϵ and  
∀u∈Σ*, v∈Σ, 
( ) if ,
( )
( ) otherwise.






The natural projection is also extended to the domain 2Σ* such 
that ∀L∈2Σ*, P(L)={P(σ)| σ∈L}. Moreover, given a DFA G, 
we define PG−1: Σo*→L(G) such that PG−1(ω)=P−1(ω)∩L(G), 
i.e., PG−1(ω)={σ∈L(G)| P(σ)=ω}. We call σ∈PG−1(ω) a 
consistent string of ω in G. 
III. GENERALIZED CURRENT-STATE OPACITY  
In this section, we first review the existing notion of 
current-state opacity with respect to a secret defined as a set of 
states. Then, we generalize the notion of current-state opacity 
by taking into account a dynamically changing secret.  
Definition 1 (Current-State Opacity) [5]: Given a system 
G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a secret S⊆X, and a set of observable events 
Σo⊆Σ, system G is current-state opaque with respect to S and 
Σo if 
(∀σ∈L(G): δ(x0, σ)∈S) 
[∃σ'∈L(G): P(σ)=P(σ') and δ(x0, σ')∉S]. 
Now, we generalize the notion of current-state opacity 
considering a secret that dynamically changes with the system 
evolution. To this aim, we define a model to describe the 
changing of the secret, which is formalized as follows and is 
called dynamic-secret model. 
Definition 2 (Dynamic-secret Model): Given a system 
G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-secret model relative to G is a DFA 
H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) such that  
1) Y⊆2X; 
2) ΣY=Σ; and  
3) ∀y∈Y, ∀t∈ΣY, δY(y, t)!. 
In words, each state of a dynamic-secret model H is a 
subset of states of system G, representing a secret. Moreover, 
a dynamic-secret model H is a complete DFA with the same 
set of events as system G. Thus, it follows that L(G)⊆L(H) 
and H actually provides the complete information whether the 
secret changes due to the occurrence of any event of system G.  
Example 1: Consider the system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0) in Fig. 1 
(a). The model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) in Fig. 1 (b) is a dynamic-
secret model relative to G. According to H, we can see that the 
initial secret of the system G is S1={A, B}. Then, every time 
the event u2 occurs in the system G, the secret changes. 
Specifically, the secret switches between S1={A, B} and 
S2={B, C}. The occurrence of other events does not change 
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Fig. 1 System G and its relative dynamic-secret model H 
 
In what follows, we propose the notion of generalized 
current-state opacity (GCSO) with respect to a dynamic-secret 
model. 
Definition 3 (Generalized Current-State Opacity): Given a 
system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, 
y0) relative to G, and a set of observable events Σo⊆Σ, system 
G is generalized current-state opaque (GCSO) with respect to 
H and Σo if  
(∀σ∈L(G): δ(x0, σ)∈δY(y0, σ)) 
[∃σ'∈L(G): P(σ)=P(σ') and δ(x0, σ')∉δY(y0, σ')]. 
In simple words, a system G is GCSO with respect to H 
and Σo if for any string σ that is generated by G and that leads 
to a state belonging to the corresponding secret, which is 
uniquely identified generating σ on H, there exists another 
string σ' that produces the same observation as σ and whose 
corresponding state does not belong to the corresponding 
secret. It is worth noting that the secret of the system may 
change with the system evolution. Thus, strings σ and σ' may 
determine two different secrets, i.e., it may occur that δY(y0, 
σ)≠δY(y0, σ'). Consequently, the physical meaning of a GCSO 
system is that its intruder can never know with certainty that 
the current state of the system is in its current secret. On the 
contrary, if the system is not GCSO, then there exists at least 
one observation based on which the intruder knows with 
certainty that the current state of the system is in its current 
secret. Note that we are assuming that the intruder is not 
interested in knowing which the current secret is.  
Example 2: Consider again the system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0) and 
the dynamic-secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) in Fig. 1. Suppose 
that Σo={a, b, c, d, e} and Σu={u1, u2}. We want to show that 
G is not GCSO with respect to H and Σo. Consider the string 
σ1=u1a that leads to state A in G and corresponds to the secret 
S1={A, B} on H, and thus it is A∈S1.We can see that the same 
observation of σ1, namely a, can be produced by only another 
string, i.e., σ2=u1au2. String σ2 leads to state C in G and 
identifies the secret S2={B, C} on H. Therefore, it is C∈S2. 
Thus, according to Definition 3, system G is not GCSO with 
respect to H and Σo.                                                                  ■ 
The following proposition presents a necessary and 
sufficient condition for GCSO.  
Proposition 1: Given a system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-
secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) relative to G, and a set of 
observable events Σo⊆Σ, system G is GCSO with respect to H 
and Σo iff 
∀ω∈P(L(G)), ∃σ∈PG−1(ω): δ(x0, σ)∉δY(y0, σ). 
Proof: (=>) Straightforward from Definition 3. 
(<=) By contradiction, suppose that  
∃ω∈P(L(G)), ∀σ∈PG−1(ω), δ(x0, σ)∈δY(y0, σ). 
Let σ1∈PG−1(ω). It thus follows that δ(x0, σ1)∈δY(y0, σ1). Since 
system G is GCSO with respect to H and Σo, by Definition 3, 
∃σ2∈PG−1(ω), s.t. δ(x0, σ2)∉δY(y0, σ2), which however 
contradicts the fact that ∀σ∈PG−1(ω), δ(x0, σ)∈δY(y0, σ). 
Consequently, it holds that  
∀ω∈P(L(G)), ∃σ∈PG−1(ω), δ(x0, σ)∉δY(y0, σ).           ■ 
Example 3: Consider again the system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0) and 
the dynamic-secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) in Fig. 1, still 
assuming that Σo={a, b, c, d, e} and Σu={u1, u2}. Since there 
exists an observation a with PG−1(a)={u1a,  u1au2} such that 
δ(x0, u1a)∈δY(y0, u1a) and δ(x0, u1au2)∈δY(y0, u1au2), by 
Proposition 1 system G is not GCSO with respect to H and Σo.    
■                                                                            
Remark 1: In our problem setting, every evolution (i.e., 
every string) identifies a pair (current state, current secret). To 
see if a system is GCSO, we should consider states and secrets 
pairs by pairs. For example, consider an observation ω that is 
produced only by two evolutions σ1 and σ2. Assume that σ1 
determines the state x1 and the secret S1 and σ2 determines the 
state x2 and the secret S2. Therefore, we should check if the 
state x1 is in the secret S1 and if the state x2 is in the secret S2. 
Several cases could occur. Some of them are sketched in Fig. 
2. (Note that not all the cases are enumerated due to the space 
constraint). If we ignore other observations but only consider 
the observation ω, the system is not GCSO in Cases (a)-(c) 
while it is GCSO in Cases (d)-(f). In particular, looking at 
Case (d), although all the possible current states are included 
in the union of the possible secrets, the system is actually 
GCSO. This is because the state x1 is not in the secret S1 if we 
consider the evolution σ1 (or the state x2 is not in the secret S2 































Fig. 2 A series of possible cases that could appear when 
observing ω assuming that PG−1(ω)={σ1, σ2} 
IV. VERIFICATION OF GENERALIZED CURRENT-STATE OPACITY  
In this section, we propose a verification method for 
GCSO. To this aim, we construct the so-called GCSO-verifier. 
Definition 4: Given a system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-
secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) relative to G, and a set of 
observable events Σo⊆Σ, the GCSO-verifier is defined as a 
DFA 
Ver(G, H)=(Z, Σo, δZ, z0), 
where 
 Z ⊆ 2X Ý ; 
 z0={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ))|σ∈PG−1(ϵ)}; 
 δZ: Z×Σo→Z is the transition function such that ∀z∈Z, 
∀t∈Σo, if ∃(x, y)∈z, s.t. δ(x, t)!, δZ(z, t) is defined such 
that  
δZ(z, t)={(x', y')∈X×Y | ∃(x, y)∈z, ∃α∈Σu* s.t.  
δ(x, tα)! ∧ δ(x, tα)=x'∧δY(y, tα)=y'}. 
Ver(G, H) is defined only considering the accessible part from 
the initial state z0, namely removing all those states of Ver(G, 
H) that are not reachable from the initial state z0 and all their 
input and output arcs. 
By Definition 4, the GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H) can be 
constructed as follows. First, we create the initial node 
z0={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ))|σ∈PG−1(ϵ)}. Next, for every 
observable event t, if there exists (x, y)∈z0 such that δ(x, t) is 
defined, we define δZ(z0, t)={(x', y')∈X×Y | ∃(x, y)∈z0, ∃α∈Σu* 
s.t. δ(x, tα)! ∧ δ(x, tα)=x'∧δY(y, tα)=y'}. If there already exists 
a node z such that z=δZ(z0, t), we simply add a transition from 
node z0 to node z via event t; otherwise, we create a new node 
z such that z=δZ(z0, t) as well as a transition from node z0 to 
node z via event t and focusing on the new node z, we repeat 
the above procedure to generate its “son nodes”. Finally, the 
GCSO-verifier is obtained.  
We observe that every node of the GCSO-verifier contains 
a set of pairs whose first entry is a state in system G and 
whose second entry is a secret identified by dynamic-secret 
model H. For the sake of presentation, we call every such pair 
a state-secret pair in the remainder of the paper. 
The following lemma characterizes nodes of the GCSO-
verifier and the language generated by the GCSO-verifier.  
Lemma 1: Given a system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-
secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) relative to G, a set of observable 
events Σo⊆Σ, and the GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H)=(Z, Σo, δZ, z0), 
it holds that  
1) ∀ω∈L(Ver(G, H)),  
δZ(z0, ω)={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ)) |σ∈PG−1(ω)}; 
2) L(Ver(G, H))=P(L(G)). 
Proof: 1) First, consider ϵ∈L(Ver(G, H)). Trivially, 
|PG−1(ϵ)|≠∅. Moreover, it is δZ(z0, ϵ)=z0={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, 
σ))|σ∈PG−1(ϵ)} by Definition 4. Then, consider ω'=ωt 
∈L(Ver(G, H)), where t∈Σo and ω∈L(Ver(G, H)) such that 
|PG−1(ω)|≠∅ and 
δZ(z0, ω)={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ)) |σ∈PG−1(ω)}.          (1) 
By Definition 4,  
∃(x, y)∈δZ(z0, ω), s.t. δ(x, t)!                       (2) 
and  
δZ(δZ(z0, ω), t)={(δ(x, tα), δY(y, tα)) |  
∃(x, y)∈δZ(z0, ω), ∃α∈Σu* s.t. δ(x, tα)!}.   (3) 
By (1) and (2), we can see that 
∃σ∈PG−1(ω), s.t. δ(x0, σt)!.                        (4) 
By (1) and (3), it follows that 
δZ(δZ(z0, ω), t)={(δ(δ(x0, σ), tα), δY(δY(y0, σ), tα)) |  
∃σ∈PG−1(ω), ∃α∈Σu* s.t. δ(δ(x0, σ), tα)!}. 
Furthermore, it is 
δZ(z0, ω')=δZ(z0, ωt)={(δ(x0, σtα), δY(y0, σtα)) |  
∃σ∈PG−1(ω), ∃α∈Σu* s.t. δ(x0, σtα)!}.   (5) 
Note that  
PG−1(ω')=PG−1(ωt)={σtα| σ∈PG−1(ω), α∈Σu*, δ(x0, σtα)!}. (6) 
Thus, due to (5) and (6), it is 
δZ(z0, ω')={(δ(x0, σ'), δY(y0, σ'))| σ'∈PG−1(ω')}. 
Also, since |PG−1(ω)|≠∅, we have |PG−1(ω')|≠∅ by (4) and (6). 
Finally, we conclude that ∀ω∈L(Ver(G, H)), |PG−1(ω)|≠∅ and 
δZ(z0, ω)={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ)) |σ∈PG−1(ω)}. 
2) Since ∀ω∈L(Ver(G, H)), |PG−1(ω)|≠∅, it is trivial to see 
that ∀ω∈L(Ver(G, H)), ω∈P(L(G)). In other words, L(Ver(G, 
H))⊆P(L(G)).  
Now, we prove that L(Ver(G, H))⊇P(L(G)). First, consider 
ϵ∈P(L(G)). Clearly, ϵ∈L(Ver(G, H)). Then, consider ω'=ωt 
∈P(L(G)), where t∈Σo and ω∈P(L(G)) ∧ω∈L(Ver(G, H)). We 
prove that ω'∈L(Ver(G, H)) as follows. Since ωt∈P(L(G)), 
ω∈P(L(G)) and t∈Σo, it holds that 
∃σ∈PG−1(ω), s.t. σt∈L(G).                     (7) 
Since ω∈L(Ver(G, H)), there exists z∈Z such that 
z=δZ(z0, ω)={(δ(x0, σ), δY(y0, σ)) |σ∈PG−1(ω)}.                 (8) 
By (7) and (8), δZ(z, t) is defined. Thus, ω'∈L(Ver(G, H)). 
Finally, it is concluded that ∀ω∈P(L(G)), ω∈L(Ver(G, H)), 
i.e., L(Ver(G, H))⊇P(L(G)). 
Consequently, P(L(G))=L(Ver(G, H)).                              ■                                                         
The verification of GCSO can be performed using the 
GCSO-verifier. Specifically, as indicted by the following 
theorem, a system is not GCSO if and only if there exists a 
node in the corresponding GCSO-verifier whose state-secret 
pairs satisfy the condition that the first entry (i.e., state) 
belongs to the second entry (i.e., secret).  
Theorem 1: Given a system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0), a dynamic-
secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) relative to G, a set of observable 
events Σo⊆Σ, and the GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H)=(Z, Σo, δZ, z0),  
G is not GCSO w.r.t. H and Σo 
 ∃z∈Z, s.t. ∀(x, y)∈z, x∈y. 
Proof: Straightforward from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. 
                                                                                           ■ 
Example 4: Consider again the system G=(X, Σ, δ, x0) and 
the dynamic-secret model H=(Y, ΣY, δY, y0) in Fig. 1, still 
assuming that Σo={a, b, c, d, e} and Σu={u1, u2}. The GCSO-
verifier Ver(G, H) is depicted in Fig. 3. We can see that there 
exists a grey node where in each state-secret pair the first 
entry belongs to the second entry. Thus, G is not GCSO w.r.t. 
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Fig. 3 Ver(G, H) relative to system G and dynamic-secret 
model H in Fig. 1 with Σo={a, b, c, d, e} and Σu={u1, u2} 
 
Remark 2: The GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H) contains at most 
22
XX´ states and 2| | 2
XX
o
´S ´ transitions since Z ⊆ 2X Ý and 
Y⊆2X. Thus, the complexity of the verification method 
is 2(| | 2 )
XX
oO
´S ´ .                                                                   ■ 
V. CASE STUDY 
In this section, we provide a practical example where the 
secret of the considered system dynamically changes.  
Consider a vehicle that visits several sites to perform its 
daily missions, including a delivery mission. In more detail, 
there are 11 sites, among which two are loading sites (named 
A and B), one is an unloading site (named C) and the others 
are passage sites (named 0-7, respectively). The possible 
movements of the vehicle are modelled by a DFA G as shown 
in Fig. 4, where each state models the position (namely, the 
current site) of the vehicle and each transition indicates the 
movement of the vehicle from one site to another. We assume 
that sensors are deployed in some areas to detect the 
movements of the vehicle. Due to physical constraints and/or 
economic reasons, not all movements are perfectly detectable. 
Therefore, some movements are unobservable, while some 
movements generate the same observation as some other 
movements. Consequently, we consider the DFA model G in 
Fig. 4, assuming that Σo={a, b, c, d, e, f, g} and Σu={u1, u2, u3}.  
Now, we focus on the delivery mission taken by the 
vehicle. We assume that it loads product α in loading site A, 
loads product β in loading site B, and unloads products (no 
matter α or β) in unloading site C. Moreover, we assume that 
1) in the case that the vehicle is empty, it is fully loaded when 
it arrives at a loading site (A or B); and 2) in the case that the 
vehicle is loaded, it is fully unloaded when it arrives at the 
unloading site C. 
Suppose that there exists an intruder who wants to know 
which product the vehicle is delivering. We assume that the 
intruder has the knowledge of the system model and monitors 
the movements of the vehicle by partial observations, namely, 
by the occurrence of observable events. 
We consider the following scenario. The intruder detects 
which product the vehicle is delivering by different means 
depending on whether or not the vehicle is empty. In the case 
that the vehicle is empty, the intruder infers with certainty that 
the vehicle is delivering product α (resp. product β) if he/she 
knows for sure that the vehicle is now in site A (resp. site B) 
since the vehicle is definitely fully loaded by product α (resp. 
product β); in the case that the vehicle is loaded, we assume 
that the intruder can take a particular means in site 2 to see 
which product the vehicle is delivering when the vehicle visits 
site 2 and we assume that the intruder is conservative in the 
sense that he/she takes such a means only when he/she knows 
for sure that the vehicle is now in site 2. As a result, in the 
case that the vehicle is empty, there are two secrets, namely, 
{A} and {B}, which should be considered simultaneously, 
while in the case that the vehicle is loaded, the secret is {2}. 
We observe that the intruder may know whether or not the 
vehicle is empty by observing the occurrence of events a and 
b in system G. Specifically, in the case that the vehicle is 
empty, if the intruder observes event a, he/she knows that the 
vehicle has been loaded since a is an output event from both 
loading sites A and B; in the case that the vehicle is loaded, if 
the intruder observes event b, he/she knows that the vehicle is 
empty again since b is an output event from unloading site C. 
Consequently, the secret of system G actually dynamically 
changes with the system evolution, and to be precise, changes 
with the observation of the intruder in this example. Here, we 
need the combination of two dynamic-secret models H1 and H2 
to describe the changing of the secret in the above scenario, 
which are depicted in Fig. 5. Note that H1 and H2 focus on the 
secret {A} and the secret {B}, respectively, in the case that the 
vehicle is empty. Consider the dynamic-secret model H1. It 
tells that the secret is S1={A} at the beginning, i.e., when the 
vehicle is empty. Once event a is observed, the intruder 
realizes that the vehicle has already been loaded and thus the 
secret becomes S2={2}. Then, once event b is observed, the 
intruder realizes that the vehicle has already been unloaded 
and thus the secret becomes S1={A} again. Hence, the secret 
always switches from S1={A} to S2={2} when a is observed 
and switches from S2={2} to S1={A} when b is observed. The 
dynamic-secret model H2 is the same as H1 except that it is 
S1={B} in H2. We consider the combination of H1 and H2 
because both the fact that the vehicle is in site A and the fact 
that the vehicle is in site B should be kept secret to the 
intruder when the vehicle is empty.  
Now, we verify if system G is GCSO w.r.t. H1 and Σo. The 
GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H1) is constructed in Fig. 6. Since we 
cannot find a node in Ver(G, H1) where each state-secret pair 
satisfies the condition that the first entry belongs to the second 
entry, we conclude that system G is GCSO w.r.t. H1 and Σo. 
Similarly, we conclude that system G is GCSO w.r.t. H2 and 
Σo by analyzing the GCSO-verifier Ver(G, H2), which can be 
obtained by replacing every element {A} in Ver(G, H1) with 
{B} and is thereby omitted due to space constraints. Since 
system G is both GCSO w.r.t. H1 and Σo and w.r.t. H2 and Σo, 
the intruder can never know which product the vehicle is 
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Fig. 5 Dynamic-secret models H1 and H2 relative to  






































 Fig. 6 Ver(G, H1) relative to system G in Fig. 4 and dynamic-
secret model H1 in Fig. 5 with Σo={a, b, c, d, e, f, g} and 
Σu={u1, u2, u3} 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This work generalizes the notion of current-state opacity by 
taking into account a dynamically changing secret. In particular, 
a dynamic-secret model is defined that describes the changing 
of the secret with the evolution of the considered system. Then, 
we propose the notion of generalized current-state opacity  
with respect to a dynamic-secret model, which physically 
characterizes the fact that the intruder can never know with 
certainty that the current state of a considered system is in the 
current secret. Moreover, we construct the so-called GCSO-
verifier by which we may verify if a system is generalized 
current-state opaque. Finally, a practical example is provided 
to illustrate the proposed notion and the verification approach.  
As a future work we plan to generalize the notion of a 
dynamic-secret model so that a single model can used to 
describe the scenario where multiple secrets are considered 
simultaneously. Also, we plan to consider the enforcement of  
the generalized current-state opacity in the case that a system is 
not generalized current-state opaque. 
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